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ABSTRACT:  Given the recent increase observed in crime and violence related to sport 
activities and the subsequent need for governments to devote more resources to deter this 
pattern, this article presents empirical evidence that could justify the possibility of taxing the 
negative externalities associated with the staging of football matches. Focusing specifically on 
theft (mainly pick pocketing) and assault (interpersonal violence or hooliganism), we seek to 
determine the extent to which this private leisure activity is responsible for negative crime 
externalities on a urban context. Drawing on data for the matches played by Football Club 
Barcelona (FCB) and geocoded crime data for the city of Barcelona (Spain), we assess whether 
there is an increase in thefts and assaults across the city of Barcelona. Then, conducting an 
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) and a spatial regression at the census tract level, we 
determine the effect of football matches on crime by comparing crime rates during home and 
away matches. We find an increase in the number of thefts across the whole city but, especially, 
in those census tracts within a 700-meter radius of the stadium, indicating that despite the 
increase in the number of police officers on duty in the vicinity of the stadium, potential 
offenders are attracted to crowds where rewards are likely to be higher and the probability of 
being apprehended lower. These results are confirmed by the relatively low number of crimes 
committed during away matches in the census tracts around the stadium. A similar spatial 
pattern is found for assaults, although the overall impact across the city is not significant. Our 
results, therefore, provide evidence of a displacement effect of violent supporters (hooligans) 
towards the census tracts closest to the FCB stadium on football days.   
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1. Introduction 
With over 52 million followers on Facebook, 11 million followers on Twitter and a 
long history of sporting success, Football Club Barcelona (FCB, hereafter) is one of the 
world’s leading football teams. Its current popularity is reflected in an average gate of 
over 70,000 spectators at its home games. Indeed, the attraction of FCB would appear to 
represent a sizeable economic benefit for the well-known city and its citizens. For 
instance, it seems probable that the club’s home matches attract a higher number of 
tourist arrivals and boost levels of consumption in the retail sector with a consequent 
positive impact on job creation and tax revenues. 
However, despite these positive economic effects, a number of negative externalities 
may affect the city as a result of its being home to such a major team and its hosting of 
such large events on a regular basis. Above all, the presence of FCB might promote 
criminal activity. Large crowds are likely to increase the number of potential targets, 
thus attracting more offenders, especially those “specialized” in property crimes (such 
as pick pocketing). Moreover, the increase in the number of social interactions, the high 
consumption of alcohol combined with the euphoria of a victory or despair of defeat can 
increase levels of interpersonal violence (Card and Dahl, 2011 and Montolio and 
Planells-Struse, 2015). Additionally, celebrations may result in other types of illegal 
behavior, including vandalism and the assault of police officers. These various forms of 
interpersonal violence are usually known as hooliganism, especially when a sport event 
is closely related.  
Violence related to football matches in Spain has recently attracted the attention of 
the media outlets and the public opinion in general. The killing of a supporter in an 
internet planned riot between the radical supporters of Atlético de Madrid (called Frente 
Atlético) and those of the Deportivo de la Coruña (called Los Suaves) in Madrid the day 
that both teams were going to play a domestic league match (29th of November 2014)1 
focused the media attention and raised many questions regarding the negative 
externalities of football matches on unlawful behavior. Few days later in Barcelona (11th 
of December 2014), and after a Champions League match played by FCB against Paris 
Saint Germain, two PSG supporters were stabbed close to the Camp Nou Stadium.2 This 
                                                          
1
 http://www.lavanguardia.com/deportes/20141130/54420902745/muere-aficionado-deportivo-ultras-
atletico.html (last accessed 10 April 2015). 
2
 http://www.lavanguardia.com/sucesos/20141211/54421303752/apunalado-seguidor-psg-camp-nou.html 
(last accessed April 2015). 
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event fuelled further the discussion regarding the close relation between football and 
violence (inside and outside stadiums).3 In this sense, and despite the efforts of FCB to 
eradicate violent behaviour inside the stadium, a violent group of radical FCB 
supporters (called Boixos Nois) continues to gather outside the stadium on match days 
to “warm up” the atmosphere. Note, however, that as previously mentioned excitement 
and alcohol consumption, among others, could also influence violent behaviour of non-
radical football fans. 
Precisely to prevent the occurrence of such violent incidents, to guarantee the 
security of citizens and also to prevent other types of criminal attitudes, large numbers 
of police officers are usually mobilized on match days. For instance, the police force 
engaged in security issues in Barcelona and its region (Mossos d’Esquadra) estimates 
that an average of 246 police officers are required to police “high risk” games, such as 
those between FCB and its historic rival Real Madrid CF. However, this deployment of 
officers and police resources generates an additional cost and one, moreover, induced by 
a private activity that has to be borne by the whole of society via general taxation. 
In response, various European governments have attempted to levy a tax to cover 
the negative externalities attributable to large-scale events in the form of higher crime 
rates. In the UK, with a long-lasting record of hooliganism, the South Yorkshire Deputy 
Chief Constable and lead on football policing for the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), Andy Holt, has stated that football clubs should cover the full cost of 
policing football matches, and not just those incurred within and around a certain 
distance of the stadiums as is current practice, given that the impact of a match affects a 
much larger area.4 
In Spain, where public finances are currently under considerable stress and there is 
a need to seek alternative sources of revenue, the debate remains ongoing. In 2014 the 
Catalan regional government budgeted a tax to cover extra policing resources for high 
                                                          
3
 This issue is, unfortunately, well spread around the world and we can find many (recent) examples in 
countries such Argentina and Chile 
(http://www.marca.com/2015/02/17/futbol/futbol_internacional/argentina/1424213985.html, last accessed 
April 2015) or in other European cities such as an aggression of Chelsea fans to an individual in the 
previous hours of a Championship match between PSG and Chelsea. 
(http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/02/18/54e44545268e3e4a728b4572.html, last accessed April 
2015). 
4
 The ACPO found a statistically significant increase in the number of crimes up to 1 km away from UK 
football grounds. British media pays attention to the debate: http://www.channel4.com/news/should-
clubs-pay-more-to-police-football-matches (last accessed April 2015). 
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risk events.5 The cost of a police officer is estimated at 35 euros per hour, which means 
policing a “high risk” match costs 54,798 euros; 35,000 of which are to be met by FCB 
in concept of extra policing costs. The Catalan Home Office estimates that an annual 
revenue of around 200,000 euros will result from this tax. However, such estimates are 
not based on the actual impact of a football match on the city’s security and this would 
require an analysis of their full effects on crime counts. Even in UK, recent high-profile 
disputes between football clubs and the police over the charges levied by the police 
have highlighted a lack of clarity regarding the cost of policing football matches. 
Football clubs report difficulties around the fringes of what is clear, transparent and 
consistent about what relates to the total policing deployment and the chargeable 
element which comes from that (see, Home Affairs Committee, 2009). 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the impact of 
FCB matches on different types of crime in an urban context. The use of geocoded data, 
the approach adopted and the techniques employed make an innovative contribution to 
the literature. Our results allow us to characterize in full the impact of the football 
matches of a leading European team on crime in a major European city. 
More specifically, we study the respective impact of FCB’s home and away 
matches on property crime (e.g., theft) and on crime against the person (e.g., assault). 
Drawing on a panel dataset (containing daily and census tract information), we present a 
descriptive analysis employing GIS techniques to show that FCB’s matches impact 
crime patterns not just around its stadium, but throughout the city of Barcelona. We also 
present a spatial confirmatory analysis of the effect of the club’s matches on crime 
around the stadium by analyzing the extent to which the agglomeration of people 
impacts each type of crime. To ensure the robustness of our results, we carry out various 
checks for crime patterns on those days when FCB play away (and when the spatial 
impacts should not be found). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature that accounts for the potential effects of football on crime. Section 3 presents 
the datasets used and the matching process applied to the data prior to conducting the 
empirical estimations. Section 4 presents the methodology for estimating the impact of 
football matches on crime and the spatial analysis used. Section 5 shows the empirical 
                                                          
5
 See, the Bill for fiscal, administrative and financial measures that accompanies the regional budget for 
2014 of the Generalitat de Catalunya: http://www15.gencat.net/ecofin_wpres14/pdf/VOL_P_MES.pdf 
(last accessed, April 2015). 
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results from the regression analysis. Section 6 presents the descriptive and confirmatory 
spatial results. Finally, section 7 sums up the paper and concludes. 
 
2. The multiple effects of football on crime: an examination of the existing 
literature 
 
A major sporting event can have a variety of impacts. In the case of football, studies 
have focused on the effects of a competition such as the FIFA World Cup on 
employment, tourism, sales, overnight stays (Allmers and Maennig, 2009; Matheson 
and Baade, 2004; Hagn and Maennig, 2008) and on psychological aspects, such as 
individual perceptions about economic prospects, both at a personal and economy-wide 
level (Dohmen et al., 2006; Süssmuth et al., 2010). Additionally, there is evidence of 
the effect of football on illegal behaviors. Kurland et al. (2014) study the effect of 
football matches on crime and examine whether football matches in UK (around 
Wembley stadium) act as crime generators or crime attractors.6 The authors, using an 
ecological approach to crime (focusing on patterns in space and time) found that, 
indeed, when Wembley stadium is used there is a significant increase of crime in the 
area that surrounds it. In a similar vein, although using aggregate Italian province level 
data, Campaniello (2011) founds a significant increase in crime (mainly property 
crimes) in those provinces that held the 1990 Football World Cup matches. Also 
analyzing the FIFA world cup tournament Kirby et al. (2013) show how football 
matches were associated with an increase in domestic violence in the United Kingdom. 
Marie (2010, 2015) describes three main channels through which football matches 
may affect crime.7 First, the concentration effect is the most straightforward of the 
effects to be considered. Simply put, an agglomeration of individuals in a particular 
place is likely to increase social interactions, which combined with high levels of 
                                                          
6
 See the crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993) for a detailed explanation of offense 
patterns and the dynamics involved; and see Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) for an explanation of 
their classification of places as crime generators or crime attractors. In a nutshell, given the importance of 
places in the crime pattern theory football matches can be seen as both a crime attractor (they draw 
intending offenders because of known suitable targets) and as a crime generator (offenders are part of the 
population that frequent the match and take advantage of the unanticipated opportunities encountered). 
7
 Spectator violence in stadiums has been a longstanding tradition and, as pointed out by Madensen and 
Eck (2008), documentation of such events is found in texts from ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. 
See Madensen and Eck (2008), and references therein, for a complete guide to address the problem of 
spectator violence in stadiums and other arena-type settings, discussing the factors that contribute to such 
incidents and reviewing the responses to the problem, and what is known about them from evaluative 
research and police practice. 
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alcohol intake may lead to interpersonal violence (clashes and fighting often referred as 
hooliganism) and property crimes (especially, theft and pick pocketing). In accordance 
with routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), for a crime to occur, a suitable 
target, a motivated offender and the absence of a capable guardian must converge in 
time and space. A football match increases exponentially the number of potential 
targets, which in turn attract a certain number of motivated offenders (above all pick 
pockets given that the rewards should be high), while the agglomeration itself reduces 
the probability of apprehension (anonymity). If these elements all converge, then we 
would expect to observe an increase in the number of property crimes around a football 
stadium on match days. 
Agglomerations, albeit at a smaller scale, may also occur in other parts of the city 
(and not only in the vicinity of the stadium), since supporters and football fans often 
gather in public places to watch the match or to celebrate (lament) a victory (a defeat). 
Therefore, a rise in thefts might be expected in other areas of the city on a match day. 
Additionally, when the team is playing away, while an impact around the stadium 
would not be expected, we might expect to see some effects in those places where 
matches can be watched (pubs and bars, etc.). 
Second, the profiles (gender and age) of the average football fan and potential 
offender are not dissimilar, which may have a number of implications for crime rates. 
Specifically, our crime dataset including known offenders in Barcelona between 2007 
and 2011 reveals that 79% were male; 76% were under the age of 40; and, 63% were 
under the age of 35, a profile that is, in general, very similar to that of football fans, as 
in the case of London, as captured by the FA Premier League Fan Survey 1994-1997. 
The coincidence of the two profiles might, on the one hand, point toward a potential 
increase in illegal activities, or, on the other, to a ‘self-incapacitation effect’, as a share 
of the population with a similar profile to those presenting a greater propensity to 
commit illegal activities will always be watching the match, resulting in a fall in the 
crime rate.8 
The third effect, also cited in Marie (2010, 2015), is that of ‘displacement’, given 
the reassignment of police officers to points around the stadium on match days. This 
                                                          
8
 Self-incapacitation due to attendance of an event by a part of the population with a greater propensity to 
commit crimes has been examined by Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) for the case of violent blockbuster 
movies. Here, we expect the incapacitation effect to be manifest during the ninety minutes of the game. 
However, after the final whistle, crime may increase as a result of both the incapacitation effect being 
lifted and the outcome of the match (Montolio and Planells-Struse, 2015). 
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represents an opportunity for criminals in areas in which levels of surveillance have 
been relaxed. The spatial analysis we perform here at the city level provides us with 
some insights as to whether this effect is evident for the city of Barcelona. Note, 
however, that if the number of police officers assigned to other areas of the city is not 
reduced on match days, this effect will not exist.  
These three channels may not appear to increase crime when the data is examined 
on a daily basis; only an hourly analysis can reveal their presence. For instance, 
Montolio and Planells-Struse (2015) detect the incapacitation effect only during the 
football match itself, while the same authors report a substitution (displacement) effect 
with police officers apparently being reassigned from certain activities (driving- and 
drug-related offenses) to others in which their primary concern is guaranteeing citizen 
security and maintaining traffic flow. 
Regarding the specific problem of hooliganism, and although our aim is not to 
unveil its determinants, there is a vast sociological, psychological and even 
anthropological literature analyzing such phenomenon.9 In the economics literature the 
evidence is scarcer. Priks (2010) empirically tests the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
using hooligan data for Sweden, finding that, indeed, frustration (team’s bad 
performance) increase unlawful supporter behavior. In this sense, this evidence points 
out how frustrated supporters can act violently even if in principle they do not belong to 
organized radical supporter groups that are those usually identified as hooligans and that 
sometime act more as street gangs being violent at random.10 Moreover, Poutvaara and 
Priks (2009) and DiDomizio and Caruso (2014) present evidence of the impact of 
counter-hooliganism policies in Sweden and Italy, respectively. 
The study reported in this paper – combining regression and spatial analyses – 
seeks to provide a precise characterization of the spatio-temporal patterns of crime and 
football in the city of Barcelona and aims at helping policy makers in their efforts to 
reduce sport-related illegal behaviors. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 See Russell (2004) for a social-psychological review on sports riots. 
10
 Note that in Spain, some members of radical supporters organizations have been linked by police forces 
with all sort of criminal activities. Examples can be found, among other, for Real Madrid CF radical 
supporters (Ultra Sur);  
http://www.elmundo.es/madrid/2014/12/17/5491f6f7268e3e37598b457e.html?a=8191dfbf0bfaec17d197d
61232f6a4c2&t=1418908926 (last accessed 10 April 2015).and for FCB;  
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/12/barcelona/1347472104.html (last accessed 10 April 2015). 
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3. Data 
3.1. Crime data 
We use a non-public dataset for the city of Barcelona containing all crimes 
registered by the autonomous police agency in Catalonia (Spanish region in which 
Barcelona is located), the Mossos d'Esquadra, which is responsible for crime 
prevention, crime solving and specialized crime investigation in the Catalan region.11 
The dataset holds reports filed by both citizens and the Mossos d'Esquadra, as well as 
by the local police (the Guardia Urbana), responsible primarily for urban traffic and 
upholding municipal laws and ordinances. 
The dataset records the time of the crime (when known), the location and the crime 
type. The dataset, which extends from 1 September 2007 to 31 December 2011,12 was 
restricted so as to include only those months that correspond to the official football 
season (i.e., June, July and August have been removed). Of the remaining 635,065 
observations, 98.74% (627,037 observations) were geocoded with a precision of within 
ten meters.13 
Illegal activities were classified in accordance with the roughly 190 articles of the 
Spanish penal code. However, to reduce the number of categories without causing an 
aggregation bias that might reduce the effectiveness of our estimations (Cherry and List, 
2002), we combined some of these articles, paying particular attention not to aggregate 
crimes with different offender motivations. For the main property crimes, we used the 
variable “Thefts”, i.e., the misappropriation of the belongings of others without resorting 
to any type of violence, while for the main crimes involving interpersonal violence, we 
included the variable “Assaults”, i.e., harmful, offensive contact perhaps resulting in 
injuries (which can be associated with hooliganism). 
After eliminating all observations responding to other crime types, the final data 
subset comprised 359,711 geocoded observations. We aggregated all the crime data up 
to the census tract level. The city of Barcelona is made up of ten districts divided into 
                                                          
11
 The Mossos d'Esquadra are responsible for virtually all police duties. The Spanish National Police 
(Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) and the military police (Guardia Civil) retain a number of administrative 
responsibilities (e.g., issuing of identity cards and passports) and undertake counter-terrorist and anti-
mafia activities. 
12
 The original dataset contained a total of 978,218 observations; with 953,257 observations that could be 
properly geocoded. 
13
 The data coordinate type was UTM-31N, based on the European Datum 50 (ED 50) projection, 
although, for the sake of homogeneity with other layers of polygons, we re-projected the coordinates to 
ETRS89. The geocoding process was undertaken, in part, by the Mossos d'Esquadra, and completed 
using GIS techniques, with some 40,000 observations being geocoded by hand using Google Maps. 
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73 neighborhoods, which are in turn broken down into 1,061 census tracts according to 
the electoral population.14 We opted to use this unit of analysis as it is the smallest 
available and, moreover, it can be directly linked to the districts, which are the primary 
spatial units employed by the police for their policing and strategy decisions. 
Additionally, as the census tracts are determined according to the population, we 
indirectly control for the population at risk in each spatial unit. 
 
3.2. Football data 
We merged the above crime dataset with that for the football matches played by 
FCB between 1 September 2007 and 31 December 2011 (again excluding the months of 
June, July and August). 
This data set contains information about the day, time, result, number of spectators 
and the location of the match (i.e., played either at home or away). Table 1 reports the 
number of matches played and the corresponding attendance figures. The level of 
attendance was high for home matches with 75% being watched by more than 60,000 
spectators and just seven being attended by fewer than 40,000 spectators.15 
 
Table 1. FC Barcelona football matches 2007 - 2011. 
Attendance # of matches 
> 80,000 spectators 36 
> 60,000 and < 80,000 spectators 58 
> 40,000 and < 60,000 spectators 24 
< 40,000 spectators 7 
Total number of  home matches 125 
Total number of away matches 130 
Type of match 
Domestic League 169 
King’s Cup 32 
European Champions League 50 
Spanish and International Super Cup 4 
Note: In this period FC Barcelona played Real Madrid CF, their main rival, ten times (home and away). 
 
                                                          
14
 We use the census tracts for the 2011 municipal elections. One advantage of this spatial division is its 
homogeneity, with each containing a minimum of 500 and a maximum of 2,000 citizens.  
15 
 FC Barcelona’s stadium, the Camp Nou, is the fifth football largest stadium in the world with a 
capacity, at February 2013, of 99,354 spectators. 
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The dataset consists of a total of 125 home and 130 away matches. The majority of 
matches were played in the Spanish domestic league (169), followed by the King’s Cup 
(32 matches played); however, the European Champions League matches (a total of 50) 
attracted by far the highest gates. Of the 255matches, ten were played against the 
historic rival, Real Madrid CF, the majority being Spanish domestic league games. 
 
3.3. Matching process 
Given the size of the dataset – comprising 255 days on which a football match was 
played (home and away), 960 days without a match, and 1,061 census tracts – we opted 
to undertake a matching process between days on which a game was played with highly 
similar days on which no match was organized. The main dataset was reduced in order 
to improve tractability and so as to be able to undertake the empirical estimations. 
The matching of ‘football days’ with ‘non-football days’ was conducted taking into 
consideration the high variation in crime rates with time. Montolio and Planells-Struse 
(2015) show that the time of day, the day of the week and the month of the year, all 
appear to play a major role in accounting for crime. Weekends are, by far, the time of 
the week when crime levels are at their highest, while summer months, the first day of 
the month and bank holidays also record higher rates of crime. In order to capture this 
variability across time units and to form a dataset in which ‘football days’ can be 
compared to ‘non-football’ days, we employed the following matching process: we 
matched the days on which a game (home and away) was played (treatment) with a day 
without football (control) ensuring that these days corresponded in terms of the day of 
the week, the month and the year and that they corresponded to neither a bank holiday 
or the first day of a month. After applying these criteria, we were able to match 107 
days in the case of home matches and 106 in the case of away matches. For the 
remaining matches we relaxed the month requirement. Hence, the remaining match days 
were matched with days that corresponded to the same day of the week in the same year 
(but not in the same month).16 In this way, we matched a further 18 days on which home 
matches were played and a further 24 on which FCB played away.  
Thus, we have two datasets: one comprising 125 days on which FCB played at 
home matched to 125 similar control days on which no football matches were played, 
                                                          
16
 The month fixed effect we introduce captures the heterogeneity across months. 
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and another comprising 130 days on which FCB played away matched to 130 similar 
control days on which no football matches were played. 
To both datasets, we added a number of variables to control for weather conditions. 
These included rainfall per day, the number of sun hours per day, the average 
temperature per day, the average daily atmospheric pressure and the average daily wind 
speed. All these weather factors have been shown to be good explanatory variables for 
crime (Anderson, 2001; Jacob et al., 2004). For instance, rainfall can reduce the 
potential number of targets in the streets as people prefer to stay at home, while the 
number of sun hours and higher temperatures can increase this number as people take to 
the streets and so the potential number of thefts also rises. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the whole city of Barcelona. 
  Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
Home match days  Match days 
Control 
days 
Match 
days 
Control 
days 
Match 
days 
Control 
days 
Match 
days 
Control 
days 
Crime variables         
Thefts 302.048 284.69 59.54 57.09 188 178 485 433 
Assaults 13.84 13.54 5.22 5.38 4 3 28 32 
Control variables         
Rainfall 1.13 3.36 2.83 10.87 0.00 0.00 14.10 79.80 
Sun hours 6.34 6.40 3.67 3.91 0.00 0.00 12.70 13.20 
Temperature 13.02 12.95 4.71 5.47 2.70 0.00 25.50 25.50 
Pressure 959.40 944.73 86.45 148.31 0.00 0.00 981.35 985.85 
Wind Speed 14.81 15.10 5.89 6.54 2.88 3.96 36.00 39.96 
Away match days          
Crime variables         
Thefts 298.13 294.18 61.88 54.95 126 182 451 433 
Assaults 14.3 14.3 4.922 4.75 3 4 27 25 
Control variables         
Rainfall 1.39 3.19 5.55 10.64 0.00 0.00 43.60 79.80 
Sun hours 7.31 6.31 3.63 3.72 0.00 0.00 13.30 13.00 
Temperature 12.96 13.16 5.30 5.84 0.00 0.00 25.90 25.60 
Pressure 960.24 937.92 84.84 167.27 0.00 0.00 982.80 984.55 
Wind Speed 14.30 14.32 5.59 5.42 2.88 3.96 36.00 28.08 
 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the days with home matches, the 
days with away matches and for the controls in both subsamples. It is evident that the 
statistics for the weather related variables are similar in the case of both treatment and 
control days. This shows that our matching process has been successful in matching 
‘football days’ with ‘non-football days’ in terms of similar temperatures, number of sun 
hours, atmospheric pressure and wind speed. Therefore, our control sample, a priori, 
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includes the same number of individuals on the streets and, hence, the same population 
at risk. 
As for the main dependent variables, the number of thefts, or pick pocketing, is 
higher on days when FCB were playing both at home and away, although when the 
match was at home the difference was much greater. In contrast, in the case of assaults, 
no difference is observed between the number of assaults committed on match days and 
on control days. As such, we do not expect to find any impact of football matches on the 
number of assaults, at least, for the city of Barcelona as a whole. 
 
4. Empirical approach: effects of football matches on crime 
4.1. Regression approach 
In order to estimate the overall effect of football matches on crime for the city of 
Barcelona, we omit, for the time being, the spatial variation of crime. In other words, we 
use the two datasets presented above with the crime counts by typology and the day of 
the year. We estimate a model of the following form: 
 
tttt
m
t XMatchAwayMatchCrime εϕγβββ +++++= 321 _   (1) 
 
where t represents the date and m the type of crime (theft or assault). Hence, Crimemt 
represents the number of crimes of type m each day t. Matcht is the variable capturing 
the fact of FCB playing at home or not. This variable takes different forms, including 
dummies for home match days, number of spectators, and different dummies to account 
for this level of attendance. Likewise, when FCB play away, we include the variable 
Away_Matcht in Eq. (1), which takes a value of 1 when FCB play away and 0 otherwise. 
X is a vector containing potential predictors of thefts and assaults including averages 
of rainfall, number of sun hours, temperature, atmospheric pressure and wind speed as 
presented above. In Eq. (1) γ is a vector that contains time fixed effects to capture any 
potential heterogeneity across days, months or years. Specifically, it contains a day of 
the year fixed effect to account for specific dates across the year. Additionally, and with 
the same objective, we include a week of the year fixed effect to account for Easter or 
the spring break. To account for heterogeneity across months, we introduce a month 
fixed effect. We also include a day of the week fixed effect to capture the heterogeneity 
of crime counts across days of the week. In this sense, weekly crime patterns seem to 
 13
increase from Wednesday to Sunday, with a marked weekend effect. We also include a 
year fixed effect to reflect the differences in crime across the five years of our data span 
and a season fixed effect to account for seasonal variations in crime. 
Finally, ϕ in Eq. (1) represents a set of variables related to the football match being 
played. Specifically, it consists of dummy variables for the competitions being played 
and a dummy variable for special matches, such as those played between FCB and Real 
Madrid CF. Finally, εt represents the error term, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with constant variance. 
In order to estimate Eq. (1), we employ a basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation with all the control variables presented above that account for variations in 
crime over time. We use robust errors to account for any potential problem arising from 
the errors. 
As a robustness test we regress Eq. (1) also adding a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 for days following a match day, also distinguishing between home and away 
matches, and 0 otherwise. This robustness exercise is carried out since the effect of 
football matches on crime may persist during the following day after the match as 
shown in Montolio and Planells-Struse (2015). The authors find that some types of 
crime, such as thefts, are significantly increase even eight hours after the football match. 
Given that on average, the typical kick off and final whistle times for FCB football 
matches are between 20:00 and 22:00 the effect of the football matches on crime could 
be recorded the next day. 
 
4.2. Spatial approach 
After estimating the overall effects of football matches on crime, we are interested 
in analyzing changes in its spatial distribution when FCB play at home and away 
(treatment) and in comparing these outcomes with ‘non-football days’ (control). To do 
so, we undertake an Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA, hereafter), which allows 
us to determine the presence of “hot spots” (areas where crime is more spatially 
concentrated) in the city of Barcelona employing kernel density functions and average 
nearest-neighbor statistics (Chainey et al., 2008).17 Additionally, we carry out a 
                                                          
17
 Using Local Indicators of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) would be a very useful tool to identify those 
census tracts with high/low values of crime surrounded by other census tracts with also high/low values 
of crime. However, for the case of Barcelona, its city centre distorts the analysis if applying this 
technique. Focusing only on the surroundings near the FCB stadium reduces the number of spatial units 
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confirmatory analysis by means of regressing crime occurrence as a function of a 
distance to the FCB stadium. More specifically, we carry out the following regression: 
 
ittt
k k
tikkikk
m
it XmatchAwayMatchMatchdistdistCrime εσϕγβββηξ ++++++++= ∑ ∑
= =
321
1400
300
1400
300
_
 (2) 
 
where i denotes the census tract, σ denotes a vector containing neighborhood and district 
fixed effects, and all the other variables and parameters are as in Eq. (1) except for two 
new parameters and variables. The first of these, ∑
=
1400
300k
kk distξ , is a set of dummy 
variables that takes a value of 1 if the centroid of census tract i is within distance k (in 
meters) of the FCB stadium and 0 otherwise. This set of dummies captures the impact 
on crime of being within a certain distance of the stadium both on ‘football days’ and 
‘non-football days’. The second, ∑
=
1400
300k
tkk Matchdistη , represents the interaction term of 
the previous distance variable and a dummy indicating a match day at the stadium. As 
such, the parameters ηk capture the effect of being within a certain distance of the 
stadium when a football match is being held. We expect the number of crimes to rise as 
we get closer to the stadium, in part, due to the greater number of social interactions 
between supporters and, in part, due to the concentration effect that attracts offenders to 
crowded areas around a stadium. 
We adopt two approaches to capture the distance decay effect. The first involves 
examining the way in which crime counts increase within cumulative rings of distance k 
(where k = 300, 400, ..., 1,400 meters). In other words, we construct cumulative rings 
that include crime counts in census tracts of increasing distances. In order to estimate 
this distance effect, we have to regress Eq. (2) k times with the k distance dummy, since 
the upper order rings are likely to be correlated to those of a lower order. The second 
approach involves estimating the non-cumulative rings. In other words, we focus on the 
way in which crime counts vary between census tracts at distance k and k-100 (in 
meters). In both cases we expect a distance decay pattern, as individuals are likely to be 
more spread out the further we move away from the stadium. It should be pointed out 
that the cumulative ring approach is more likely to show the effect of football matches 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and, hence, the use of LISA technique it is not a plausible solution since it is not recommended for 
datasets with few number of spatial units (Anselin, 1995). 
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on crime at greater distances since with this approach all rings include the census tracts 
that lie closest to the stadium, i.e., those that are most likely to show a significant 
increase in their crime counts. 
With the inclusion of this new dimension (the census tracts), the non-trivial number 
of zeros and the positive skewed distribution of the crime counts, we cannot use OLS 
since our results could be biased. Moreover, the data present a problem of over-
dispersion. In other words, the variance of the crime counts (both thefts and assaults) is 
larger than their mean. Therefore, we use a negative binomial approach that takes into 
account all the characteristics that differ from the standard assumptions underlying the 
OLS estimation.18 It should be pointed out that the iteration process rarely converged 
when introducing census tract fixed effects. Consequently, we can only approximate the 
census tract fixed effects by means of district and neighborhood fixed effects. 
 
5. Regression results 
We estimate Eq. (1) using different definitions for the home matches.19 We first 
present the results in Table 3 of the impact of an additional 10,000 spectators on the 
theft and assault counts. The first column represents a simple correlation with no control 
variables. Column 2 includes all time fixed effects except for the year fixed effects. 
Column 3 includes also the weather control variables. Finally, in column 4 we include 
the year fixed effects.  
Results in Table 3 show that an additional 10,000 spectators increases the number of 
thefts by around seven; we are able to explain approximately 75% of the variation of 
thefts across the city of Barcelona. In the case of assaults an increase of 10,000 
spectators does not have a significant impact. The average number of assaults (given by 
the constant) is much lower than the average number of thefts and, also, compared to 
the theft regressions, the models for assaults are only able to explain, as expected, 
around 36% of the variance in the number of assaults. 
Table 4 shows the average effect of a football match being played at home on theft 
and assault counts. The four columns represent the same estimated model as in Table 3 
                                                          
18
 Note that given that we estimate a negative binomial model, the coefficients reported in the 
corresponding tables are the incidence rate ratios that represent the increase or decrease in percentage of 
the number of counts of each crime type. 
19
 For the sake of homogeneity throughout the paper we perform these initial regressions with the dataset 
containing ‘football days’ (home and away matches) and their respective controls as presented in section 
3.3. Nevertheless, when using the full dataset (containing all available days), we obtain very similar 
results. The tables are not reported but are available upon request. 
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above. The estimated coefficients in column 4 show that, on average, there are 40 thefts 
more on those days when FCB play at home. In the case of assaults, there is no 
significant increase in the number of assaults committed in the city of Barcelona. 
 
Table 3. OLS estimations. Effect of number of spectators on theft and assault counts. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
Spectators/10,000 3.797*** 7.818*** 6.555*** 7.079*** 
 (0.978) (2.228) (2.057) (2.065) 
Constant 279.9*** 300.7*** 262.4*** 233.4*** 
 (4.986) (14.87) (18.67) (16.42) 
R-squared 0.059 0.686 0.735 0.750 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
Spectators/10,000 0.0867 -0.126 -0.183 -0.213 
 (0.0914) (0.248) (0.253) (0.243) 
Constant 13.38*** 13.37*** 11.73*** 11.60*** 
 (0.465) (1.705) (2.170) (2.180) 
R-squared 0.004 0.344 0.356 0.365 
Observations 250 250 250 250 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: Climate controls include: average rainfall, average number of sun hours, average temperature, 
average pressure and average wind speed. Time controls include: day of the week, day of the year, week 
of the year, weekend and month. Seasonal controls include dummies for summer (mainly September) and 
winter. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4. OLS estimations. Effect of matches played at home on theft and assault counts. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
Match 17.36** 40.70*** 41.53*** 40.56*** 
 (7.378) (9.348) (8.258) (8.564) 
Constant 284.7*** 289.9*** 241.9*** 237.8*** 
 (5.107) (13.41) (18.01) (16.98) 
R-squared 0.022 0.669 0.723 0.737 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
Match 0.304 0.321 0.374 0.406 
 (0.671) (1.057) (1.072) (1.065) 
Constant 13.54*** 12.03*** 11.20*** 11.47*** 
 (0.481) (1.762) (2.082) (2.164) 
R-squared 0.001 0.343 0.355 0.363 
Observations 250 250 250 250 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: see Table 3. 
 
It might be the case that only the big matches, i.e., those with over 80,000 
spectators, affect crime. In our sample, 36 matches can be considered as high risk or 
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“hot” in terms of crime with attendances recorded at over 90% of the stadium’s 
capacity. The variance in the number of spectators might affect the way in which 
potential offenders perceive their opportunities for committing crimes and their 
potential rewards. Yet, if police deployment is greater during these “hot” matches, 
pickpockets may decide that their activities are only worthwhile on match days when 
police deployment is less intense. In the case of assaults, “hot” football matches may 
increase the number of potentially violent supporters or hooligans. In order to account 
for the effect of big matches, Table 5 includes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if the home match is played before more than 80,000 spectators. 
Table 5 shows the impact of big home football matches on theft counts. In column 
4, the most complete model, the estimated coefficients identify an increase of almost 23 
thefts on such occasions. On days when match attendance does not reach 80,000, the 
increase is 18 for the whole city of Barcelona. In the case of assaults, the city of 
Barcelona does not, on average, suffer a significant increase in the number of assaults 
on big match days. 
 
Table 5. OLS estimations. Effect of ‘big’ home matches on theft and assault counts. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
> 80,000 spectators 43.63*** 20.28*** 19.59*** 22.82*** 
 (11.41) (7.364) (7.096) (6.823) 
Match 4.795 30.19*** 19.34** 18.37** 
 (7.773) (8.597) (7.886) (7.393) 
Constant 284.7*** 289.7*** 242.0*** 236.6*** 
 (5.117) (13.29) (17.64) (16.01) 
R-squared 0.078 0.679 0.733 0.749 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
> 80,000 spectators 1.902* 1.480 1.465 1.324 
 (1.114) (1.065) (1.074) (1.066) 
Match -0.244 -0.445 -0.317 -0.238 
 (0.702) (1.088) (0.949) (0.936) 
Constant 13.54*** 12.01*** 11.21*** 11.40*** 
 (0.482) (1.790) (2.086) (2.163) 
R-squared 0.014 0.350 0.362 0.368 
Observations 250 250 250 250 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: See Table 3. 
 
So far we have considered the overall impact of home football matches on theft and 
assault counts. However, as discussed above, away football matches might also increase 
criminal activity in the city given that people typically gather in the city’s pubs and bars 
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to watch the game. This could generate similar crowding effects that might attract 
pickpockets or result in outbreaks of violence since alcohol is usually consumed while 
following the match. Table 6, however, shows that neither theft nor assault counts are 
significantly affected by FCB’s away matches. Although the average number of pick 
pocketing is higher on those days when FCB play away, after controlling for weather 
conditions and time varying variables this increase is not statistically significant. In the 
case of assaults, we even find a negative effect, although here again it is not 
significant.20 
 
Table 6. OLS estimations. Effect of away matches on theft and assault counts. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
Away match 3.946 2.727 8.482 13.05 
 (7.259) (15.24) (15.94) (14.29) 
Constant 294.2*** 341.1*** 280.6*** 255.0*** 
 (4.820) (14.49) (21.32) (19.00) 
R-squared 0.001 0.715 0.739 0.768 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
Away match 1.069* -0.740 -0.396 -0.245 
 (0.600) (3.071) (2.900) (3.187) 
Constant 13.24*** 13.62*** 12.68*** 11.23*** 
 (0.417) (2.498) (2.999) (2.870) 
R-squared 0.012 0.376 0.393 0.410 
Observations 260 260 260 260 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: see Table 3. 
 
6. Spatial results 
6.1. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) 
After analyzing the overall effect of home and away football matches on theft and 
assault counts, we incorporate the spatial dimension by introducing the 1,061 census 
tracts of the city of Barcelona. We first present the descriptive statistics of the 
distribution of crime in the city of Barcelona and we carry out an ESDA analysis to 
                                                          
20
 Tables A1 (for attendance in home matches) and A2 (for away matches) in the appendix present the 
robustness exercise when considering the impacts on the day after the match. The results, obtained after 
including all the observations in the regressions (that is, the matching process was not applied), are very 
similar to the ones discussed in the main text. In general, the impact of football matches on crime, even if 
present for some hours after the match that belong to the following day, vanishes given that our time unit 
is the day and for the whole next day, as expected, we do not find any impact. 
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show the main crime patterns on days when FCB play at home, on days when FCB play 
away and on ‘non-football days’ (controls).  
Columns 1 and 4 in Table 7 show the relative increase in theft and assault counts, 
respectively, in census tracts whose centroid is located at a distance of k meters from the 
center of the FCB stadium relative to the total increase for the whole city of Barcelona. 
Specifically, we show the results of the following formula: 
 
controlHome
Barcelona
controlHome
k
i
Crime
Crime
−
−
∆
∆
    (3) 
 
where the numerator in Eq.(3) represents the increase in the variable Crimeki (either 
thefts or assaults) in census tract i whose centroid is located within k meters of the 
center of the football stadium on days with no football (control) and on days when FCB 
play at home. The denominator simply represents the increase in the number of crimes 
in the whole of the city of Barcelona. Consequently, if the ratio is greater than 0, then 
the number of crimes within those census tracts located within a distance of k meters 
suffers a higher increase than the increase experienced by the city of Barcelona as a 
whole on the days when FCB play at home. 
 
Table 7. Relative increase in the number of crimes. 
  Thefts Assaults 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Increase Control days Match days Increase Control days Match days 
< 300 2.72% 0.05% 0.20% 13.16% 0.00% 0.29% 
< 400 15.35% 0.50% 1.35% 31.58% 0.71% 1.39% 
< 500 24.38% 0.75% 2.11% 50.00% 1.30% 2.37% 
< 600 26.64% 0.83% 2.31% 60.53% 1.30% 2.60% 
< 700 29.86% 0.99% 2.65% 55.26% 1.71% 2.89% 
< 800 30.97% 1.14% 2.85% 57.89% 1.89% 3.12% 
< 900 37.60% 1.70% 3.76% 65.79% 2.42% 3.82% 
< 1,000 39.91% 2.07% 4.50% 73.68% 2.60% 4.16% 
< 1,100 43.13% 2.54% 5.17% 84.21% 3.01% 4.80% 
< 1,200 43.59% 3.03% 5.69% 65.79% 3.90% 5.26% 
< 1,300 42.72% 3.44% 6.05% 44.74% 4.61% 5.49% 
< 1,400 42.35% 3.84% 6.42% 42.11% 5.02% 5.84% 
 
As can be seen in columns 1 and 4 of Table 7, the increase in theft and assault 
counts in the census tracts located within a certain distance of the stadium represents a 
sizeable share of the total increase for the whole city on days when there is a home 
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football match. Specifically, in the case of thefts, the increase in census tracts within a 
radius of up to 1,200 meters represents 43.59% of the total increase. After this 
threshold, the share decreases, either because the numerator falls or because the 
denominator rises, or both. From the percentages presented in columns 2 and 3, which 
represent the share of thefts committed in census tracts located within a certain distance 
on ‘non-football days’ (controls) and on days when FCB play at home respectively, it 
can be seen that the number of thefts in the census tracts whose centroid is within 1,300 
meters (or more) of the stadium increases more on the control days than on the days 
with home football matches. This means that the concentration effect seems to 
disappear after a certain distance. 
In the case of the number of assaults, column 4 shows that the census tracts that are 
located within 1,100 meters of the stadium account for up to 84.21% of the total 
increase in the number of assaults across the whole of the city. This increase is not 
homogenous indicating that the increase in the number of assaults in these census tracts 
on match days is lower than it is on control days, thus reducing the representation of the 
total increase in the assault count. Columns 5 and 6 show the share of assaults 
committed in census tracts located within a certain distance with respect to the total 
number of assaults in Barcelona on ‘non-football days’ (controls) and on days when 
home football matches are played, respectively. Again, the share of assaults committed 
when FCB are playing at home is higher than the share on ‘non-football days’ for all 
distances. 
After analyzing the main statistics and the concentration of thefts and assaults in the 
census tracts located in the vicinity of the FCB stadium, we are able to depict these 
results in cartographic form. We show the kernel density estimations in order to identify 
the places in the city of Barcelona where the risks of being a victim of theft or assault on 
certain days (‘football’ and ‘non-football’) are highest. Kernel density estimations 
simply provide a smooth estimate of the point process derived by means of a moving 
window (bandwidth) over the data. In this sense, the objective is to estimate how event 
levels vary continuously across a study area based on an observed point pattern for a 
sample of points (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995; Williamson et al., 1998). The estimated 
kernel values represent the predictive risk surface for each type of crime analyzed, in 
other words, the potential number of events per square km when taking into account 
potential contagious effects from other areas. 
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Delimiting the area in which to measure the risk of a certain crime, that is, the radius 
of the circle centered on each grid cell containing the points that contribute to the kernel 
density calculation, is known as the bandwidth decision problem. Large bandwidths 
result in over smoothing, with low density values and, therefore, an over generalized 
view, while small bandwidths result in maps that are spiky in appearance because of the 
jumps between spatial units (producing images similar to point patterns). Several rules 
of thumb have been suggested by Williamson et al. (2000) and Bailey et al. (1995) 
based mainly on the k-nearest neighbor mean distances, and dependent on the detail of 
analysis that the researcher wishes to obtain (city, county, neighborhood, street, parking 
lot, etc.). However, the bandwidth must also be theoretically justified since it reflects 
the contagious nature of a particular crime across space. For instance, thefts from 
vehicles may cluster in a specific parking lot because it has no surveillance cameras. It 
is reasonable to think that thefts from vehicles are likely to occur in the parking lot with 
the same degree of probability. If the lot extends over 250 meters, then a 250- or 300- 
meter bandwidth would capture the potential contagious effect. However, choosing a 
larger bandwidth will have the effect of extending the probability of thefts from vehicles 
to other areas where no cars are parked. Another example would be domestic violence, 
which tends to be highly focused on specific households. As such, the bandwidth of the 
kernel density estimation should be very small. In our case, we use a bandwidth of 300 
meters for both thefts and assaults.21 
In line with our matching process, we first calculate the kernel density functions for 
thefts and assaults on those days when FCB played at home (KH) and for their 
respective controls (KCH). We then compute the difference, KH - KCH, and plot it on a 
map. In Figure 1, Map 1A shows this difference for thefts and Map 1B for assaults. The 
areas shaded red present the largest increases in the number of thefts and assaults 
between days when FCB played at home and days without football (controls) while the 
areas shaded blue present the largest shifts in the other direction. The unshaded areas 
present no change in their theft or assault counts. 
Map 1A shows that, in the case of thefts, there is an increase mainly in two areas of 
the city: first, in the city center where people gather in bars and pubs to watch the match 
and where victories are celebrated; and, second, in the vicinity of the stadium (identified 
                                                          
21
 Theoretically, the bandwidth for the assaults should be smaller since the contagious effect is lower; 
however, we opt to use the same bandwidth to make both maps comparable. 
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on the map with a green dot, see also Figure A1 in the appendix). A similar pattern is 
found in Map 1B for the number of assaults. An increase is observed especially in the 
city center, but also in areas surrounding the stadium. 
 
Figure 1. Difference in kernel density values between days when FCB play at home and 
days with no football (control days). 
Map 1A: Thefts. Map 1B. Assaults. 
 
 
Note: Quadratic kernel functions. The representation is the density function per square km using natural 
breaks so as to identify outliers clearly. Bandwidths are set at 300 meters for both thefts assaults. Cell size 
is set at 20 meters to show as much detail as possible. 
 
In Figure 1 the kernel density functions are the result of the difference between the 
kernel densities for the number of crimes committed on days when FCB play at home 
and those for the crimes committed on ‘non-football days’ (controls). The areas outlined 
in black on the two maps in Figure 1 denote “hot spots” corresponding to differences in 
densities on days when FCB play away and ‘non-football days’ (controls). As such, we 
plot on the same map increases attributable to both home and away matches. It is clear 
that these respective differences (i.e., home matches vs. controls and away matches vs. 
controls) do not coincide. On those days when FCB play away, there appear to be 
increases in theft and assault counts both in the center of the city and in certain areas 
where pubs and bars concentrate. 
In order to focus our analysis on the vicinity of the FCB stadium, the maps in Figure 
2 show only the crimes committed within a certain distance of the stadium. In this way 
 23
we are able to understand more fully the fluctuations in crime counts around the football 
stadium.22 
Map 2A shows that the number of thefts increases markedly when FCB play at 
home. This is particularly evident in the streets en route to the stadium from the main 
transport facilities. The circles outlined in black indicate the hot spots found when 
computing the difference in the kernel values when FCB play away and ‘non-football 
days’ (controls). Here, again the respective patterns (i.e., home matches vs. controls and 
away matches vs. controls) do not coincide. Map 2B shows similar results for the case 
of assaults. Although concentrated in smaller areas, there also appears to be a high 
concentration of assaults in the vicinity of the stadium. 
 
Figure 2. Kernel density functions around FCB stadium for thefts and assaults when 
the club plays at home, away, and on days without a match. 
  Map 2A: Thefts.    Map 2B. Assaults. 
 
 
  Note: See Figure 1. 
 
6.2. Confirmatory analysis 
In order to confirm the crime concentration patterns around the FCB stadium when 
FCB play at home, we first estimate the effect of the distance to the stadium on the 
number of thefts and assaults. These results are presented in Table 8 where we also 
                                                          
22
 Figure A1 in the appendix shows exactly the area of the city presented in Figure 2. 
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include the square of the distance to account for possible non-linear relationships 
between crime and distance. Results show that the number of thefts in the census tracts 
is negatively affected by the distance to the stadium: the greater the distance, the lower 
the theft count. However, it is worth noticing that the square of the distance presents a 
coefficient greater than one, indicating a positive impact on the number of thefts. This 
non-linearity suggests that the effect of the distance on the number of thefts is convex, 
that is, the greater the distance, the smaller the effect on the number of thefts, with the 
reduction in this effect being higher. This reflects the potential presence of the 
concentration effect. In the case of assaults, Table 8 shows no effect of distance on the 
assault count. 
 
Table 8. Distance decay effect. Distance and square distance. Negative binomial. 
VARIABLES Thefts Assaults 
Distance*Match 0.890*** 0.968 
 (0.0212) (0.0605) 
Distance^2*Match 1.009*** 1.002 
 (0.00244) (0.00592) 
Constant 3.223*** 3.847*** 
 (0.0400) (0.374) 
Observations 265,250 265,250 
Climate controls YES YES 
Time controls YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES 
District fixed effects YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effects YES YES 
Note: see notes to Table 3. Each distance is estimated separately so as to avoid any correlation between 
rings at different distances. Coefficients reported as incidence rate ratios. Standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, we estimate Eq. (2) for both thefts and assaults using the cumulative and non-
cumulative rings (or buffers); see Tables 9 and 10 respectively.23 Table 9 shows the 
results for all home matches (columns 1 and 3) as well as for home matches with an 
attendance in excess of 80,000 (columns 2 and 4). 
In the case of thefts, the results show a clear distance decay pattern as we move 
away from the stadium – being in a census tract whose centroid is less than 300 meters 
from the stadium when FCB are at home increases the number of thefts by an average of 
                                                          
23
 As explained in Section 4.2, each ring represents an increase of 100 meters from the stadium and 
includes all additional census tracts whose centroid falls within the ring. When using cumulative rings, all 
census tracts up to the distance ring are included. Figure A1 in the appendix maps the rings used, while 
Table A3 shows the number of census tracts included in each ring. 
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260% and by 400% on the day of a big match. This huge increase in pick pocketing 
during big matches in the same census tract as that of the stadium points to a clear 
concentration effect. Note that this impact is decreasing as we move away from the 
stadium. 
 
Table 9. Cumulative rings. Negative binomial. Home and ‘big’ home matches. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Thefts Thefts 
(Big matches) 
Assaults Assaults 
(Big matches) 
<300 m 2.604*** 4.000*** 5.011*** 8.613** 
 (0.652) (1.068) (2.059) (7.003) 
< 400 m  2.202*** 2.684*** 1.749** 1.870 
 (0.368) (0.368) (0.461) (0.749) 
< 500 m 2.502*** 2.745*** 1.837** 2.247** 
 (0.306) (0.300) (0.511) (0.710) 
< 600 m 2.534*** 2.714*** 2.020** 2.582*** 
 (0.279) (0.273) (0.555) (0.760) 
< 700 m 2.555*** 2.769*** 1.695** 2.309*** 
 (0.267) (0.259) (0.420) (0.632) 
< 800 m 2.339*** 2.546*** 1.661** 2.455*** 
 (0.232) (0.217) (0.394) (0.636) 
< 900 m  2.257*** 2.306*** 1.589** 2.414*** 
 (0.199) (0.174) (0.341) (0.558) 
< 1,000 m 2.129*** 2.129*** 1.619** 1.619** 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.333) (0.333) 
< 1,100 m 1.935*** 1.982*** 1.613** 2.317*** 
 (0.146) (0.119) (0.307) (0.473) 
< 1,200 m 1.812*** 1.810*** 1.364* 1.993*** 
 (0.126) (0.0979) (0.238) (0.388) 
< 1,300 m 1.752*** 1.697*** 1.195 1.923*** 
 (0.116) (0.0865) (0.197) (0.358) 
< 1,400 m 1.700*** 1.611*** 1.166 1.910*** 
 (0.108) (0.0778) (0.185) (0.342) 
Observations 265,250 265,250 265,250 265,250 
Climate controls YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES 
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Note: see notes to Table 3. Each distance is estimated separately so as to avoid any correlation between 
rings at different distances. Coefficients reported as incidence rate ratios. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The distance decay pattern for assaults appears to be very similar to that observed 
for thefts. Here again there is a sharp decrease in crimes between census tracts located 
within 300 meters of the stadium and those located within a radius of 400 meters. The 
marked increase in assaults in the census tracts closest to the stadium are presumably 
attributable, as previously explained, to the fact that a greater number of social 
interactions, and possible rivalries between opposing football fans, can lead to clashes 
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and fighting. In the case of big football matches there appears to be a greater impact on 
crime at all distances computed from the stadium. 
Table 10 presents our analysis of effects on crime counts at specific distances from 
the stadium, without taking into account census tracts that lie closer to the football 
ground. These non-cumulative distance rings show the impact of home football matches 
in census tracts located 100 meters apart. 
 
Table 10. Non-cumulative rings. Negative binomial. All matches and ‘big’ matches. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Thefts Thefts Assaults Assaults 
  (Big matches)  (Big matches) 
<300 m 2.661*** 4.141*** 5.483*** 8.633** 
 (0.667) (1.105) (2.479) (7.893) 
>300 and  < 400 m  2.177*** 2.598*** 1.554 1.358 
 (0.412) (0.389) (0.626) (0.634) 
>400 and  < 500 m 3.132*** 2.936*** 1.666 2.824** 
 (0.556) (0.535) (0.712) (1.364) 
>500 and  < 600 m 2.957*** 2.553*** 2.135*** 17.84** 
 (0.644) (0.629) (1.056) (20.59) 
>600 and  < 700 m 2.372*** 2.655*** 0.701 1.142 
 (0.645) (0.561) (0.407) (0.890) 
>700 and  < 800 m 1.044 1.474* 1.309 4.377* 
 (0.337) (0.312) (1.000) (3.431) 
>800 and  < 900 m  1.993*** 1.774*** 1.324 2.236 
 (0.357) (0.257) (0.642) (1.118) 
>900 and  < 1,000 m 1.109 1.315** 1.977 0.701 
 (0.225) (0.178) (1.395) (0.738) 
>1,000 and  < 1,100 m 1.229 1.365*** 1.542 2.782** 
 (0.184) (0.159) (0.744) (1.361) 
>1,100 and  < 1,200 m 1.178 1.059 0.523 0.546 
 (0.182) (0.127) (0.233) (0.406) 
>1,200 and  < 1,300 m 1.151 0.860 0.324* 1.306 
 (0.199) (0.113) (0.187) (0.836) 
>1,300 and  < 1,400 m 1.102 0.875 0.850 1.729 
 (0.216) (0.116) (0.470) (1.143) 
Constant 3.088*** 3.084*** 9.202*** 4.039*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.740) (0.376) 
Observations 265,250 265,250 265,250 265,250 
Climate controls YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES 
District fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Neighborhood fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Note: see Table 9. 
Our results provide a clearer indication of the distance at which the impact of 
football on crime disappears. In the case of thefts, distance decay is clear, although not 
homogeneous as there are specific rings that present higher levels of thefts than rings 
that are closer to the stadium. This presumably reflects the fact that certain 
circumstances of an area are likely to increase the number of thefts. For instance, the 
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ring of census tracts located at a distance of between 700 and 800 meters from the 
stadium presents almost no impact on the number of thefts. The effect of football 
matches on the number of thefts seems to disappear in census tracts located at an 
average distance of 900 meters from the stadium and in those located at 1,100 meters 
when FCB is playing a big match. 
The largest increase in the number of assaults during home football matches occurs, 
as previously found, in census tracts located within 300 meters of the stadium. Indeed, it 
is probable that the majority of these incidents occur in the same census tract as that in 
which the stadium is located. The effect seems to disappear in census tracts located 600 
meters from the stadium; however, it reappears in census tracts located between 800 and 
1,000 meters from the ground. Again, the presence of specific places (bars, pubs, 
parking areas, etc.) could explain the spatial patterns observed. 
 
6.3. Placebo test 
We conduct a final exercise to verify the robustness of the above results by 
estimating the following equation: 
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where the only difference with respect to Eq. (2) is that here we estimate the impact of 
being in a census tract at a certain distance from the stadium on a day when FCB play 
away. The results (see Table 11) indicate that, in general and as expected, when FCB 
play away the crime counts (both for thefts and assaults) are significantly lower in areas 
close to the stadium. Note that the only ring that shows an increase in the number of 
thefts and assaults during away football matches is the one located between 300 and 400 
meters from the stadium. This result may be identifying a specific location 
(concentration of bars or pubs) in which people gather to watch the (away) match. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the overall effects and the spatial 
displacement/concentration effects of football matches on thefts (mainly pick 
pocketing) and assaults (related to hooliganism in the present set up) in an urban 
context. Using an OLS regression approach we first estimated the impact on crime 
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across the city of Barcelona of Football Club Barcelona playing at home and away. The 
results show clear evidence of an increase in thefts when FCB play at home; however, 
this trend is not present for assaults or when FCB play away.  
 
Table 12. Placebo test (non-cumulative rings). 
Variables Thefts Assaults 
<300 m 0.269*** 1.70e-08*** 
 (0.0229) (1.77e-08) 
>300 and  < 400 m  1.704*** 1.475*** 
 (0.144) (0.0448) 
>400 and  < 500 m 0.924 0.866 
 (0.166) (0.155) 
>500 and  < 600 m 0.394*** 0.545 
 (0.135) (0.474) 
>600 and  < 700 m 0.361*** 0.703*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0302) 
>700 and  < 800 m 0.162*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0368) (0.111) 
>800 and  < 900 m  0.927 0.386** 
 (0.813) (0.184) 
>900 and  < 1,000 m 0.446*** 0.600*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0995) 
>1,000 and  < 1,100 m 0.389*** 0.528*** 
 (0.0722) (0.121) 
>1,100 and  < 1,200 m 0.575 0.813* 
 (0.368) (0.0982) 
>1,200 and  < 1,300 m 0.334*** 0.824 
 (0.0550) (0.117) 
>1,300 and  < 1,400 m 0.458*** 0.597* 
 (0.138) (0.171) 
Observations 275,860 275,860 
Climate controls YES YES 
Time controls YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES 
District fixed effects NO YES 
Neighborhood fixed effects NO YES 
Note: see Table 9. 
 
In order to analyze in depth how large crowds attending football matches can impact 
criminal behavior, we analyzed crime patterns around the FCB stadium and found that 
both the number of thefts and assaults increased significantly. This pattern was 
confirmed using an ESDA and by undertaking a regression analysis. Specifically, we 
found that the number of thefts increased significantly in census tracts located within a 
900-meter radius (1,100 meters on big match days) of the stadium, while the increase 
recorded in assaults was limited more specifically to areas located in the vicinity of the 
stadium entrances, that is, in census tracts located within a 600-meter radius (700 meters 
on big match days) of the stadium. 
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These results – the overall effects and the spatial crime patterns – point to two 
different crime generating processes. First, the spatial patterns indicate a clear 
concentration effect for both types of crime. In the case of thefts, large crowds attract 
pickpockets that perceive (in terms of the Routine Activity Theory) that their rewards 
will be higher and their probability of being apprehended lower, despite the increase in 
police presence around the stadium. The attractiveness of the targets may also drive part 
of this effect; the presence of spectators carrying cameras and cash, in addition to a 
large number of inattentive tourists, serve as magnets for pickpockets.  
In the case of assaults, the spatial patterns also point to a concentration effect around 
the stadium when FCB play at home pointing out to the presence of interpersonal 
violence or hooliganism. Indeed, in the census tracts closest to the stadium (and in the 
census tract in which the stadium is located) the number of assaults increases 
significantly. However, the absence of any effects for the city as a whole (whether FCB 
are at playing home or away) suggests a second effect, that of displacement from other 
areas of the city to the stadium on match days. A possible explanation for this might be 
the similar profiles shared by football fans and potential offenders. The results reported 
in this study, however, do not control for the extra policing provided on match days, as 
no data are available. Yet, we have been able to show the significant increase in the 
number of thefts across the city of Barcelona even though there is a greater presence of 
police officers when FCB play at home. 
Thus, in addition to shedding light on the effects of football matches on crime in an 
urban context, this paper may also be used for the effective allocation of police patrols 
in the city of Barcelona. As the ESDA and kernel density function analyses show, not 
only does the number of thefts in the vicinity of the stadium increase, there is also a rise 
in such crimes in the center of the city and in and around large transport hubs, including 
metro and railway stations. This indicates that additional police officers should be 
assigned to the area around the stadium and to certain parts of the city, including the 
city center, which suffers (approximately) half of the overall increase in the number of 
thefts. 
The policy implications of our results are multiple. For instance, we have presented 
strong evidence of the increase in certain types of crime throughout the city of 
Barcelona when football matches are played, above all around the FCB stadium. An 
increase in illegal activities is recorded in relation to the celebration of a private leisure 
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activity such as football and, hence, additional public resources must be devoted to 
control for these negative externalities. 
While it is true that private institutions already contribute to public budgets via 
regular tax payments, the extra costs society has to face as a result of their activities 
need to be taken into consideration. In this regard, we still have much to learn about 
adapting taxation to the real costs attributable to the impact of football on illegal 
behavior. For instance, the real costs would have to take into account not only the need 
for extra police officers on match days around the stadium but also the need for 
additional policing in other crowed places in the city where, on match days, increases in 
thefts are recorded. Additionally, the police should not only monitor crowds at the 
entrance to the stadium, as they do now. As we have shown, the impact of football 
matches extends over a radius of more than 1 km in the case of thefts and around 500 
meters in the case of assaults. In sum, any tax levied should take into account the direct 
costs of assigning extra police patrols within a radius around the stadium in which 
football is known to have a significant impact on crime. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. OLS estimations. Effect of home matches on theft and assault counts. Day 
after the match. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
Spectators/10,000 3.787*** 8.249*** 7.300*** 7.800*** 
 (0.746) (2.171) (2.068) (2.110) 
Day after -2.091*** 0.166 0.0759 0.183 
 (0.612) (0.432) (0.418) (0.411) 
Constant 280.0*** 300.1*** 286.0*** 266.0*** 
 (1.742) (4.682) (8.013) (7.902) 
R-squared 0.042 0.563 0.607 0.640 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
Spectators/10,000 0.208*** -0.174 -0.233 -0.210 
 (0.0693) (0.230) (0.237) (0.237) 
Day after 0.0726 0.0269 0.0235 0.0253 
 (0.0617) (0.0544) (0.0530) (0.0531) 
Constant 12.47*** 11.12*** 10.49*** 10.20*** 
 (0.162) (0.509) (0.874) (0.916) 
R-squared 0.011 0.251 0.271 0.272 
Observations 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: Climate controls include: average rainfall, average number of sun hours, average temperature, 
average pressure and average wind speed. Time controls include: day of the week, day of the year, week 
of the year, weekend and month. Seasonal controls include dummies for summer (mainly September) and 
winter. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A2. OLS estimations. Effect of away matches on theft and assault counts. Day 
after the match. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Thefts Thefts Thefts Thefts 
Away match 17.43*** 6.646 8.398 12.20 
 (5.691) (8.549) (10.26) (9.362) 
Day after -15.19*** 0.754 2.082 2.350 
 (4.514) (3.569) (3.396) (3.222) 
Constant 280.7*** 284.6*** 272.8*** 254.1*** 
 (1.754) (4.548) (8.029) (7.962) 
R-squared 0.023 0.569 0.611 0.643 
 Assaults Assaults Assaults Assaults 
Away match 1.882*** -1.091 -0.944 -0.784 
 (0.460) (2.646) (2.530) (2.624) 
Day after 0.936* 0.181 0.265 0.284 
 (0.478) (0.422) (0.424) (0.425) 
Constant 12.47*** 11.12*** 10.49*** 10.20*** 
 (0.162) (0.509) (0.874) (0.916) 
R-squared 0.018 0.261 0.280 0.283 
Observations 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089 
Climate controls NO NO YES YES 
Time controls NO YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Seasonal controls NO YES YES YES 
Derby dummy NO YES YES YES 
Note: See Table A1. 
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Table A3. Buffers from the FCB stadium. Census tracts included in each ring. 
Distance from FC Barcelona stadium # of census tracts 
<300 m 2 
>300 m and <400 m 4 
>400 m and <500 m 6 
>500 m and <600 m 4 
>600 m and <700 m 4 
>700 m and <800 m 7 
>800 m and <900 m 9 
>900 m and <1,000 m 7 
>1,000 m and <1,100 m 10 
>1,100 m and <1,200 m 10 
>1,200 m and <1,300 m 8 
>1,300 m and <1,400 m 7 
 
 
Figure A1. 
Area depicted in Figure 2. Cumulative rings (buffers) around FCB’s 
stadium 
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